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RECENT DECISION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FEDERAL IMMUNITY - NATIONAL
BANKS IMMUNE FROM STATE TAXATION. Appellant, a national
bank, applied to the State Tax Commission for an emergency
regulation exempting it from the recently enacted sales and use
taxes. Instead, the regulation promulgated, which was held
valid by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated
that the bank was subject to the taxes. The United States
Supreme Court, in reversing the decision, held that 12 U.S.C.
§ 548 exclusively prescribed the means by which a state could
tax a national bank and thereby rendered appellant immune from
the taxes in question. First Agricultural National Bank of
Berkshire County v. State Tax Commission ........... U.S ...........
(1968).
Although the United States Constitution provides that all
"powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States" 1
and the Constitution specifically enumerates those powers which
are vested in the Congress, 2 many conflicts have arisen in those
areas where both the state and federal governments have sought to
exercise their respective powers. This problem has been further
complicated by the implied expansion of the congressional powers
under the constitutional provision that it "make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the
powers enumerated.3 When considering the solutions to such dis-
putes it should be borne in mind that the Constitution, and the
laws of the United States promulgated thereunder, "shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." 4 One area in which this conflict of
powers became apparent early in our history was the states' power
to tax an instrumentality of the federal government.
One of the first and most important decisions to be rendered
in this area was McCulloch v. Maryland.2 The constitutional
question arose when Maryland imposed a stamp tax on the issuance
of notes by any bank established within the state without the
authorization of said state. When McCulloch, a cashier at the
Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States, issued notes
on behalf of the bank without complying with the requirements
of the statute, the state brought an action to recover certain penal-
I U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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ties which were provided for in the act. The United States
Supreme Court, in reversing the state court's decision which held
the tax valid, viewed the case as involving two basic issues: (1)
had Congress the constitutional power to incorporate the bank;
and (2) can the bank and its branches be taxed by the states?
In answer to the first issue, the Court determined that the govern-
ment, being entrusted with certain vital powers, e.g., to lay and
collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, and to raise
and support armies, must also be entrusted with ample means for
their execution. Those means were provided for by the power to
make all laws which shall be "necessary and proper" for carrying
into execution the powers of Congress.0 Mr. Chief Justice Mar-
shall, speaking for the Court, concluded that the creation of the
bank was not only an appropriate mode for exercising the powers
of Congress, but also that it was "a convenient, a useful, and
essential instrument in the prosecution of [the government's] fiscal
operations. . . ."'
The Court then proceeded to the second issue, and it was
reasoned that the federal government, being sovereign, could not
be burdened by the states in any way. Relying on the principle
that the powers of the federal government were not granted by
the states but, rather, by the people of all the states, the Court
concluded that the federal government owed no tax, duty or ex-
cise to any state for any privilege conferred or benefit received.,
It was further reasoned that if such power existed in the states
at all, it could be used to interfere substantially with, or even
destroy, the activities of the national governmentY Referring to
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the Chief Justice rea-
soned that it was the very essence of supremacy that the federal
government "remove all obstacles to its action within its own
sphere, and ...modify every power vested in subordinate govern-
ments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influ-
ence." '10 In accordance with these views, the Maryland statute
was found to be unconstitutional and void.
Five years later, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,"'
the Court was given an opportunity to re-examine its holding in
McCulloch. One significant issue which was treated more thorough-
ly in this case than in McCulloch was whether the national bank
actually was a federal instrumentality. The defendant contended
Old. at 411-12.
7Id. at 422.
S ld. at 434-35; see Comment, Immunity of State an;d Federal Instra-
mentalities from Taxation: A Broad or a Narrow Constrtction?, 17 TUL.
L. REv. 100, 108 (1942).
9 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427.
"ld. at 427.
122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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that the bank was "originated for the management of an individual
concern, to be founded upon contract between individuals, having
private trade and private profit for its . . . principal object." 12
However, the Court determined that the bank was created for
national purposes only, was of vital importance to the government,
and was, therefore, a government instrumentality entitled to the
same immunity as had been extended in McCulloch.13 Mr. Chief
justice Marshall made it clear that if the "character" of the bank
were different, the result would be otherwise.14 Thus, although
this decision further confirmed the national bank's right to im-
munity, this tax immunity was seemingly unavailable if grounded
solely upon the mere "casual circumstances" of being employed by
the government in the transaction of fiscal affairs.' 5
As the political debates over the treatment of national banks
grew more frequent and heated, Congress began to enact more
legislation in this field in an attempt to clarify the functions of the
banks as well as to insure their safety from the taxing powers of
the states. The principal statutes were the National Ban Acts of
1863 '1 and 1864.17 In addition to specifically prescribing the duties
and obligations of these banks, and the means for their creation,
the statute expressly provided four methods in which Congress
would allow the states to tax a national bank, any one of which
was to be in lieu of all others.' s This section, coupled with the
principles laid down in the two previously mentioned cases, gave
rise to a long line of decisions which held that these means of






5 See Pious & Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland Right Principle, Wrong
Case, 9 STAN. L. REv. 710, 725-26 (1957).
10 Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
'7 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
Is Originally Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 111. Found
today in 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964), and it provides:
The legislature of each State may determine and driect . . . the
manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associa-
tions located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said
shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable
income of an owner or a holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations
on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net
income ...
1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above
four forms of taxation shall be in lieu of all others....
3. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property
of associations from taxation in any State....
19 See Bank of California Nat'l Ass'n v. Richardson, 248 U.S. 476 (1919);
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. City of New York, 121 U.S. 138 (1886); Rosen-
blatt v. Johnston, 104 U.S. 462 (1881). See also People ex rel. Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Goldfogle, 234 N.Y. 345, 137 N.E. 611, cert. denied, 261
U.S. 620 (1922).
198]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro,20 the Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether these statutes had
so altered the "character" of a national bank as to render it taxable
by the states. Relying on these statutes and the constitutional
groundwork laid down in McCdloch and Osborn, the Court con-
cluded that the tax levied by the state on the intangible property
of the bank was invalid. While the relationship of the national
bank to the federal government under the Civil War statutes was
not as close as it had been under the charters with which the
Court had earlier dealt, it was apparent that national banks were
still considered federal instrumentalities completely immune from
state taxation, if for no other reason than that these banks were
at all times engaged in the inherently governmental function of
issuing currency. Apparently relying on the unequivocal language
of Owensboro,, subsequent cases assumed the immunity from taxa-
tion of national banks, and no longer considered the issue of
whether such immunity was justified.21
Howbver, national banks were not the only institutions which
claimed to be tax-exempt instrumentalities of the federal govern-
ment. In Railroad Co. v. Peniston,22 a subdivision of the state of
Nebraska imposed a tax on the property of the Union Pacific
Railroad, a company chartered by Congress. The railroad was
owned by private individuals but was assisted by the Congress
through grants and loans. The government appointed two of its
directors, and certain of its operations were subject to federal
supervision. It was further provided that the railroad would
transmit dispatches for the government and transport mail, troops
and munitions, supplies and public stores whenever so required.
The Court conceded that the railroad was an agent of the United
States government and was "employed, in the legitimate service of
the government, both military and postal . . ." 23 but denied that
the railroad was immune from taxation:
It is . . . manifest that exemption of Federal agencies from State taxa-
tion is dependent . . . upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the
question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve
20173 U.S. 664 (1899).
21 See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Natl Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239
(1931); First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927); First Nat1
Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341 (1926). In these cases the Court was
concerned with state taxation of shareholders of a national bank under con-
gressional permission conditioned upon the non-discriminatory application of
such taxes. It was assumed that national banks were immune from state
taxation absent congressional consent. See Rollman, Recent Developments
in Sovereign Immunity of the Federal Government from State and Local
Ta.xes, 38 N.D.L. REv. 26, 27 (1962); 68 DIcw. L, RE:v. 469, 470 (1964).
2285 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5 (1873),
23 Id. at 32,
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the government as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the
efficient exercise of their power.24
The Peniston decision was an obvious departure from the
rationale set forth in McCulloch and Osborn. Although the rail-
road was considered a federal agency, that fact alone was not suf-
ficient to confer immunity from state taxation. The Court looked
further to the nature of the tax and its actual effect upon the
activities the agency performed for the federal government. Thus,
the cases clearly distinguished institutions like the national banks
which were thought so much an arm of the federal government
as to be inherently immune 25 from institutions related to the
operation of the federal government which were taxable upon
a showing that their federal activities would not be substantially
hindered.
2 6
One of the most recent cases in which the question of im-
munity arose was Departnwnt of Employment v. United States.2 7
The litigation concerned a Colorado unemployment compensation
tax which, by statute, could be levied on charitable institutions.
24 Id. at 36.
25 See Maricopa, County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 350 U.S. 357 (1943),
where the Court found the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to be an
immune instrumentality. It is clear that a state cannot constitutionally
levy a tax directly against the United States Government or its property
without Congressional consent. United States v. Allegheny County, 322
U.S. 174 (1944).
It is interesting to note that the courts had some difficulty in deciding
whether the tax immunity granted to a governmental instrumentality should
be extended to include the employees thereof. In New York ex rel. Rogers
v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937), the Court granted the same tax immunity
to salaried employees as it gave to the Panama Railroad Co., the tax-
exempt employer. However, this question was finally laid to rest in Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), where the Court over-
ruled the previous case, finding no reason to extend this immunity to the
employee. See also State Tax Comm'r v. Van Colt, 306 U.S. 511 (1939).
26 In recent years, the Supreme Court has been liberal in allowing such
taxation. See, e.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (allow-
ing a state tax on the purchase of lumber by a contractor who was con-
structing an army camp for the United States on a "cost-plus" basis);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (upholding a state
gross receipt tax levied against a contractor in the service of the federal
government to construct locks and dams for the improvement of naviga-
tion); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178 (1933) (a tax
on the production and sale of electric power by a company created and
operated under the Federal Water Power Act was upheld). Of substantial
import is the Court's reasoning that "the Government's constitutional im-
munity does not shield private parties with whom it does business from
state taxes imposed on them merely because part or all of the financial
burden of the tax eventually falls on the Government.' United States v.
City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1957).
27 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
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This tax was levied against the local chapter of the National Red
Cross and a refund of the taxes paid, along with injunctive relief
against further enforcement, was sought on the ground that the
Red Cross is entitled to complete immunity as a federal govern-
ment instrumentality. The Court, although stating that "there is
no simple test for ascertaining whether an institution is so closely
related to governmental activity as to become a tax-immune instru-
mentality,"28 held that the Red Cross was clearly such an instru-
mentality.20 The Court discussed fully the nature of the Red
Cross, its functions, organization and importance to the govern-
ment, and concluded that because of its relationship with the gov-
ernment and the public, it met the requisites for such immunity.30
It is interesting to note that the Court, in rendering its opinion,
drew an analogy between the Red Cross and the national bank:
In those respects in which the Red Cross differs from the usual gov-
ernment agency . . . the Red Cross is like other institutions-e.g..
national banks-whose status as tax-immune instrumentalities of the
United States is beyond dispute.31
But is this status of being a tax-immune instrumentality truly
beyond dispute? Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York, as
did the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the instant
case, re-examined this question in Liberty National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Buscaglia.2  After discussing the great changes which have
taken place, both in the nature and functions of the national banks,
the Court unanimously concluded that the national banks were no
longer deserving of immunity from state taxation as a federal
instrumentality.
In the instant case 33 the Supreme Court, for practically the
first time in seventy years, was given the opportunity to re-
sId. at 358-59.
291d.
3 0 The Court pointed out that the Red Cross was chartered by the Con-
gress in 1905, that it was subject to governmental supervision and regular
financial audits and that the President appoints its principal officer and
seven of its forty-nine Governors. It was further pointed out that, in
addition to private contributions, the Red Cross receives substantial mate-
rial assistance from the federal government. The Court also discussed the
important functions of the Red Cross in relation to our armed forces, to
our states in times of disaster, and to the fulfillment of our national and
international commitments (e.g., the Geneva Convention). Based upon these
facts, the Court found that the Red Cross is virtually "an arm of the
Government." Id. at 359.
3'Id. at 360 (emphasis added).3221 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967), redg 26
App. Div. 2d 97, 270 N.Y.S.2d 871 (4th Dep't 1966).
33First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, . U.S.(1968), rev'g ..... Mass ........ 229 N.E.2d 245 (1967).
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evaluate the arguments regarding such immunity. When Massa-
chusetts put its sales and use tax in effect, the appellant, one of
the ninety national banking associations in the state, immediately
requested a ruling from the ta.x commission that it would be exempt.
Nothing was heard from the commission for the next two months
during which appellant paid some $575.66 in taxes to vendors
on purchases of tangible personal property needed for its continued
operation. Finally, the commission announced that national banks
would be subject to the tax, whereupon appellant found it impos-
sible to purchase goods unless it promised to reimburse the vendors
for the tax. The bank sought declaratory relief from the state
courts, but the regulation was held to be valid.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the state court's holding,
premised its opinion on what it termed the firmly established prop-
osition "that the States are without power, unless authorized by
Congress, to tax federally created, or, as they are presently called,
national banks." 14 In other words, the Court refused to re-
examine the status of the national banks as federal instrumentalities,
and, relying on such cases as McCulloch and Owensboro, deter-
mined that unless Congress has passed legislation permitting the
tax in question, a national bank would be immune therefrom.
The Court then quoted from its opinion in Department of Employ-
ment v. United States 35 where, in dictum, it was stated that the
bank's status as a tax-immune instrumentality was "beyond
dispute."
The Court next turned to the abundance of federal legislation
in the banking field, looking primarily at 12 U.S.C. § 548 as the
section on which this case depends. The statute allows state taxa-
tion of national banks in any one of four specified ways.36 In
order to determine whether the act was meant to exclude all other
forms of taxation, the Court examined the Congressional records
of 1864 (the year in which it was originally passed) and concluded
that it was the intent of the legislature that it be exclusive.3 7 After
this determination, the majority traced the history of the enactment
to gain support for its conclusion and culminated with the fact
that in 1950 a bill was sent to the Senate Subcommittee on Bank-
ing and Currency which expressly permitted the levying of state
sales and use taxes on national banks.38 Since Congress refused
34 ...... U.S. at .......
35 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
36 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964); for text thereof see .supra note 18.
37 What was actually said were reverberations of the principles laid down
in McCulloch. and Osborn and all that was proven was that Congress was
very much concerned with the implementation of these doctrines.
38 See Hearings on S. 2547 before the Subcomm. on Federal Reserve
Matters of the Senate Comin. on Banking & Currency, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., 9 (1950).
199]
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to pass the proposed amendment, the Court was certain that no
such tax could be said to have been authorized by Congress. Thus,
the majority concluded that as the law exists today the tax must be
held invalid as against national banks, and if any change is to be
made in the future, it must emanate from the Congress.3 9 The
Court thereafter briefly dealt with the contention that this was a
tax on the vendor rather than the purchaser, deciding that the
intent was clearly to pass the tax on, to the vendee and, therefore,
the legal incidence of the tax was on the national bank.
The three dissenting justices strongly disagreed with the
majority's assumption that the national bank was a federal instru-
mentality and that the Constitution, therefore, prohibited the levy-
ing of such a tax on appellant. The dissent argued that the Court
should have decided the constitutional question in order that sec-
tion 548 be properly interpreted, and further added that had such a
course been taken, new life would not have been given to this
"largely outmoded doctrine." 40
It was noted that almost all the decisions rendered which
involved national banks were decided in accordance with the prin-
ciples of McCulloch, Osborn, and Owensboro, and that very little
effort was devoted in subsequent cases to question whether the
banks were still federal instrumentalities. The dissent, however,
compared the banks involved in the three leading cases with the
national bank of today, and reached the conclusion that it is no
longer deserving of such immunity. There is no simple test for
ascertaining whether an institution is so closely related to govern-
mental activity as to become a tax-immune instrumentality, 41 but
certain basic factors have evolved through the years on which the
Court has placed reliance.4 2  In applying these factors the dissent
was firmly convinced that the bank was not deserving of the
immunity, especially in the light of the trend in Supreme Court
decisions toward restricting "the scope of immunity [from taxes]
of private persons seeking to clothe themselves with governmental
character." 43
.9 ...... U.S. at .......
401d. at .......41 Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-59
(1966).
42 The more general tests are: whether they have been so incorporated
into the government structure as to become instrumentalities of the United
States; or whether they are arms of the Government deemed by it essential
for the performance of governmental functions, and are integral parts of a
governmental department and share in fulfilling the duties entrusted to it.
Some of the more specific factors taken into consideration are: whether
it is organized for private profit; whether the government exercises sub-
stantial control over its operations; whether it was organized to effect a
specific governmental function; and whether the government gives it finan-
cial aid . ...... U.S. at .......
43 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 352 (1949).
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The Second Bank of the United States, the bank dealt with in
McCulloch and Osborn, if scrutinized today, would probably be
found to meet the criterion necessary to be held an instrumen-
tality4 4 : the United States owned twenty percent of its stock; the
President appointed five of its twenty-five directors while the
Government, as a shareholder, participated in the election of the
remainder; all public funds were deposited in the bank; the bank
was required to transmit funds for the government without charge;
it issued currency which was established as the legal tender for all
debts owing to the Government; and the bank acted as the fiscal
agent of the United States. Even the national bank considered
in Owensboro was more meritorious of immunity than the present-
day bank. That bank was authorized to issue currency which was
established as the legal tender for all debts owed to or by the fed-
eral government. In addition, this currency was to be secured by
the bank's deposit of United States bonds with the Treasury
Department.:"
But what great governmental functions do the present-day
national banks perform? The dissent found that they perform no
significant fiscal services for the federal government. By 1935,
the power of national banks to issue currency had ceased. Most
of their duties are now handled by the Federal Reserve banks.4"
Moreover, legislation was enacted to prohibit the government from
discriminating between national banks and banks under the Federal
Reserve System 47 (of which the greater portion of state banks are
4 But see Plous & Baker, supra note 15, at 718, 725, where the authors
note that throughout the opinion in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
made no mention of the essentially private character of the bank. The
authors felt that the Chief Justice erred in identifying the bank as synony-
mous with the sovereign itself. The authors noted the private ownership
of the bank and that it was a profit-making enterprise during the life of
which the government earned $6,100,000, while the bank itself earned$6,600,000 directly attributable to its association with the federal govern-
ment.
4r ...... U.S. at .......
46For an interesting discussion of the McCulloch case as it might be
applied today, see Plous & Baker, mtpra note 15, at 728-30, where the
authors contend that the McCulloch reasoning would be better applied today
to the Federal Reserve System, which they feel meets all the requirements
for such immunity. Although the stock is owned by private member banks,
all seven members of the Board of Governors are selected by the President.
It is also pointed out that although the Reserve earns sufficient income to
cover operating expenses, pay dividends to members and contribute to a
surplus fund and to the U.S. Treasury, the profit aspect is purely incidental
to the System's major function. Unlike the United States Bank considered
in McCulloch, the purpose of the Reserve is that of the public interest in
orderly economic growth and a stable currency. The authors feel that the
national bank was not the best choice for the Chief Justice to have estab-
lished such an important principle of law.
47 12 U.S.C. §265 (1964).
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members) .4  No difference could be found between the state and
national banks, both being privately owned and controlled, both
existing for private profit, and both performing the same tasks.
Likewise, there could be found no reason why the national bank
should be entitled to immunity from state taxation as a federal
instrumentality.
The dissenting justices then turned to section 548, upon which
the majority based its decision. Admitting that there is substantial
precedent for the statutory interpretation that the methods of taxa-
tion specified are exclusive, the justices noted that this interpreta-
tion is correct only under the constitutional premise of Owensboro.
Since that premise was rejected by the dissent, they asserted that
the section should be freshly examined. The statute, specifying the
four means of taxation and holding that any one imposed be in
lieu of all others, was found by the dissent to have been merely
intended to insure the competitive equality of national banks by
preventing the states from subjecting them and their shareholders
to multiple taxation on the same income.49 And this was the sole
purpose for its enactment.
The section never expressly provided that the taxes prescribed
were exclusive. Under the earlier constitutional premise, it could
have been argued that Congress saw no need to state specifically
in section 548 that national banks were immune from state taxation
except as the section permitted, but under the dissent's finding no
such contention could be supported. Moreover, the tax which is
here in question was non-existent when the section was adopted.
The dissent concludes that the courts "should be reluctant to
interpret a statute having such narrow scope as section 548 in terms
has as encompassing such a broad prohibitory application." -0
As the responsibilities of state and local governments in our
complex society require the expenditure of rapidly increasing
amounts of money, the states have had to resort to new and more
comprehensive forms of taxation. Although the amount involved in
the instant case was insignificant, the states are nevertheless being
deprived of an abundant source of revenue by the Court's continua-
tion of this outmoded constitutional immunity doctrine.
There are approximately 13,804 commercial banks in the
United States and 4,815 of these are national banks. Although the
national banks comprise only one-third of the banks in number,
the deposits in national banks total 171 billion dollars as compared
to 139 billion dollars in the state banks.51 These private institu-
tions carry on vast businesses, earning huge profits, and engage in
4 8 See Hockley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 566(1966).
4. ...... U.S. at .......
5o Id. at .......
51 See supra note 48.
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numerous transactions which, if immunity is no longer required,
would bring them under the taxing power of the states in which
they operate. As recently as 1965, the Chase Manhattan Bank of
New York City, the largest state member bank in New York and
the third largest bank in the nation, saw fit to convert from a state
charter to a national charter.52  Should this simple statutory
change entitle the bank to be immune from the City and State of
New York taxes? The answer to this question, it is submitted,
is an unequivocal no.
On the other hand, the scope of federal government activity
has been greatly expanded and, today, the United States conducts
much of its business through a substantial number of private
parties.53 The federal government has turned to the private sector
of the economy to act as its agent in performing those ordinary
services which are required but not within the realm of govern-
mental operations. However, while states must not be permitted
to hamper lawful activities of the federal government, private
parties have sought to deprive the states of an important source of
revenue on the sole ground that the federal government is a party
to the transaction. This is carried even further in the case of the
national bank where immunity from state taxation is sought on
the ground that the bank can perform certain services for the gov-
ernment. For far too long the national banks have been granted
this immunity, not on the basis of their relationship to the federal
government, but rather on the holdings of a few cases which date
as far back as a century and a half.
The courts have made it clear that the purpose of federal
immunity from taxation is not to give special benefits to certain
parties, but rather to preserve and protect valid functions of the
federal government. The trend in the United States has been to
reject immunizing those private parties who deal with the federal
government from non-discriminatory state taxes, as a matter of
constitutional law, even though the United States may bear the
economic brunt of the tax, either by inclusion in the charge for
the service or by reimbursement to a contractor as an item of
costY4 In order that the national bank be granted immunity, the
bank must prove that the imposition of the tax would impair a
function of the federal government. This burden of proof is even
more onerous in the light of the policy considerations which seek
to preserve and expand wherever possible the right of the state to
tax those within its borders.
In conclusion, what the majority has done by its refusal to
pass upon the constitutional issues in this case is to deprive the
52 Id. at 568.
53See Rollman, Recent Developments in Sovereign Immunity of the Fed-
eral Government from State and Local Taxes, 38 N.D.L. REv. 26, 30 (1962).
r' Id.
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states of a needed source of income to which they are entitled.
And, even more important, it has given new life to a constitutional
doctrine which is clearly outmoded and unfair. The Court has
grabbed a statute and broadened its application to an extent never
before intended in its attempt to avoid passing on the principal
issue. It was hoped that the Court, when it agreed to hear this
appeal, would take advantage of the opportunity to examine the
federal immunity doctrine in the light of today's needs, of today's
banking policy of fostering competitive equality, and of today's
banking system and the metamorphosis that it has undergone since
the Supreme Court last passed upon the issues here involved.
Instead, the decision rendered was merely a verification that past
law still applies regardless of new developments, and only the dis-
sent realized the true impact that this opinion could have provided.
Let us again hope that the Court, when and if it should decide to
hear a case of similar import will re-evaluate its holding in the
instant case and determine to take on the task of facing the consti-
tutional issue squarely, as it should have done here.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INcRIMINATION - GAMBLER'S
ASSERTION OF SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE CONSTITUTES DE-
FENSE FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL WAGERING TAX STATUTES-
Petitioner, convicted of violating the federal wagering tax statutes
by conspiring to evade and wilfully failing to pay the annual occu-
pation tax, and failing to register with the Internal Revenue
Service as required by law, unsuccessfully argued to the trial court
that these statutory requirements violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provisions could
not be utilized to impose criminal sanctions on persons who prop-
erly asserted the privilege as a defense for non-compliance.
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
In recent years, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination ' has become the center of a continuing controversy
concerning the balance of individual liberties and public interest.
A major aspect of this conflict has involved the application and
enforcement of the Federal Gambling Stamp Tax.2 This tax re-
quires all professional gamblers to purchase an annual fifty dollar
I "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4401-23, 6107.
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